Law is a complex social practice; in the words of a classical author: the whole social life contemplated from a special side. Therefore, the discussion on the (most appropriate) way of understanding the law is a matter of general interest, although obviously the most concerned are the professional jurists: practical and theoretical.
This book is based on the idea that thinking is largely a collective action that consists not only of thinking with others, but also of others; although the latter does not mean denying the cooperative character of thought: to build or destroy. Thus, throughout its ten chapters we comment on the work of a dozen contemporary authors heterogeneous among themselves: some are philosophers — interested in law — and others — the most — jurists (iusfilophosus), and among the latter there are positivists, iusnaturalists, post-itivists and even positivists in transit to post-mightitivism. And it is done with the purpose of inciting them (as do the occasional readers of the book) to confront their way of understanding the law with that defended by the author, which consists of a certain form of post-perpositionivism.
Legal post-perpositionism, speaking in general, is a conception that regards law as a very complex and socially ubiquitous human artifact that cannot be reduced to a system of rules; it is essentially an activity, a social practice aimed at achieving certain purposes and values. That is why the theory of law cannot be limited to describing and explaining a phenomenon (the law is not simply an object that is out there), but must also (this would even be its central function) establish guidance criteria for those in-practice and, in particular, for professional jurists.