By claiming to be high level of abstraction, the concepts of the theory of law have never been entirely independent of the legal systems that attempt to explain or rebuild. This is seen most clearly when today uses the conceptual arsenal of positivist theory, once the legalistic model of the rule of law, which was his benchmark, has undergone significant changes since the middle of last century.

Constitutionalism of rights is not intended to embody a new legal paradigm or a new doctrine of the law, but just to name a set of phenomena produced in our legal systems as a result of the emergence of markedly rigid constitutions and equipped with a wide range of fundamental rights, which are also intended strictly regulatory and judicially guaranteed. From here, however, it is possible to test different concepts that also respond to conflicting cultural traditions, constitutionalism or democracy, or natural law positivism, neoconstitutionalism or guarantees, formalistic interpretative or hermeneutical theories and normativists and argumentative theories.

The ten essays collected in this volume respond to various concerns and even have a uniform bill. However, it can be seen in all of them a common thread, which is precisely the constitutionalism of rights or some of its implications for the legal system. The first chapters adopt an approach that could perhaps be described as meta-theoretical, terciando not lacking in some doctrinal controversies, on the other hand, philosophical and political implications; other contributions are more theoretical or reconstructive certain aspects of the model; others, in short, may well join the dogmatic effort to better understand the regulatory scope of certain fundamental rights.